of his soul, when he besought us; and we would not hear; Therefore is this distress come upon us.-Behold also his blood is required.

From this instructive passage of history, the following • observations naturally arise. 1. That a sense of right and wrong in conduct, or of moral good and evil, belongs to human nature. 2. That it produces an apprehension of merited punishment, when we have committed

evil.

3. That although this inward sentiment be stifled during the season of prosperity, yet in adversity it will revive. And, 4. That, when it revives, it determines us to consider every distress which we suffer, from what cause soever it has arisen, as an actual infliction of punishment by Heaven. The consideration of these particulars will lead us to a very serious view of the nature of man, and of the government of God.

I. There belongs to human nature a sense of moral good and evil, or a faculty which distinguishes right from wrong, in action and conduct. They said one to another, We are verily guilty.—In an age, when the law was not yet given, when no external revelation of the Divine will subsisted, except what had been handed down among the patriarchs, from one generation to another; the brethren of Joseph reasoned concerning their conduct, upon the same moral principles, and were affected by the same feelings, of which we are conscious at this day. Such sentiments are coeval with human nature; for they are the remains of a law which was originally written in our heart. In the darkest regions of the earth, and among the rudest

tribes of men, a distinction has ever been made between just and unjust, between a duty and a crime. Throughout all the intercourse of human beings these distinctions are supposed. They are the foundation of the mutual trust which the transactions of life require; nay, the very entertainments of society constantly appeal to them. The Historian, who studies to magnify his hero, by representing him as just and generous: the Poet, who seeks to interest the world in his fictions, by engaging the heart in behalf of distressed virtue; are sufficient to confute the Sceptic, who denies any natural perception of a distinction in actions.

But though a sense of moral good and evil be deeply impressed on the heart of man, yet it is not of sufficient power to regulate his life. In his present corrupted state, it is both too general to afford him full direction in conduct, and too feeble to withstand the opposition of contrary principles in his nature. It is often perverted by ignorance and superstition; it is too easily overcome by passion and desire. Hence, the importance of that divine revelation, which communicates both light and strength; which, by the instructive discoveries it makes, and by the powerful assistance it supplies, raises man to a station infinitely superior to that which he possesses under the mere light of Nature.

It is of consequence, however, to remark, that this revelation necessarily supposes an antecedent sense of right and wrong to take place in the human mind. It addresses itself to men, as possessed of such a faculty; and, when it

commands them, in general terms, to pursue whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, pure, lovely, or of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, it plainly appeals to the native dictates of their heart. Nay, unless men were endowed by nature with some sense of duty or of moral obligation, they could reap no benefit from revelation; they would remain incapable of all religion whatever. For, in vain were a system of duty prescribed to them by the word of God; allegiance were in vain required towards their Creator, or love and gratitude enjoined towards their Redeemer; if, previously, there was no principle in their nature, which made them feel the obligations of duty, of allegiance, and of gratitude. They could have no ideas corresponding to such terms; nor any conviction, that, independently of fear or interest, they were bound to regard, either him who made, or him who redeemed them. This, therefore, is to be held as a principle fundamental to all religion. That there is in human nature, an approving or condemning sense of conduct; by means of which, they who have not the law, are a law unto themselves. They who, from a mistaken zeal for the honor of Divine revelation, either deny the existence, or vilify the authority of natural religion, are not aware, that by disallowing the sense of obligation, they undermine the foundation on which revelation builds its power of commanding the heart.

The text leads us to observe, that one of the cases in which the natural sense of good and evil operates most

forcibly, is when men have been guilty of injustice or inhumanity. We saw the anguish of our brother's soul, when he besought us: and we would not hear. An inward principle prompts us to do good to others; but with much greater authority, it checks and condemns us, when we have done them injuries. This part of the human constitution deserves to be remarked as a signal proof of the wisdom of its Author, and of the gracious provision which he has made for the welfare of mankind. We are all committed, in some measure, to the care and assistance of one another. But our mutual influence reaches much farther with respect to the evils, than with respect to the enjoyments of those around us. To advance their prosperity, is often beyond our ability: but to inflict injuries, is almost always within our power: and, at the same time, selfinterest very frequently tempts us to commit them. With the utmost propriety, therefore, we are so framed, that the influence of the moral principle should be most autho ritative, in cases where its aid is most needed; that to promote the happiness of others, should appear to us as praiseworthy, indeed, and generous; but that, to abstain from injuring them, should be felt as a matter of the strictest duty.-Amidst the distress which the Patriarchs suffered in Egypt, had only this suggestion occurred, "We saw our brother beginning to prosper, and we contributed not to his advancement," their minds would have been more easily quieted. But, when their reflection was, We saw his anguish when he besought us and we would not hear, then compunction turned upon them its sharpest edge. I proceed to observe,

II. That our natural sense of right and wrong, produces an apprehension of merited punishment when we have committed a crime. When it is employed in surveying the behaviour of others, it distinguishes some actions, as laudable and excellent; and disapproves of others, as evil and base. But when it is directed upon our own conduct, it assumes a higher office, and exercises the authority of a judge. It is then properly termed Conscience; and the sentiments which it awakens, upon the perpetration of a crime, are styled, Remorse. Therefore, said the brethren of Joseph, is this distress come upon us; behold also his blood is required. They acknowledged, not only that they had committed a wrong, but a wrong for which they were justly doomed to suffer.

Did not conscience suggest this natural relation between guilt and punishment, the mere principle of approbation, or disapprobation, with respect to moral conduct, would prove of small efficacy. For disapprobation attends, in some degree, every conviction of impropriety, or folly. When one has acted unsuitably to his interest, or has trespassed against the rules of prudence or decorum, he reflects upon his conduct with pain, and acknowledges that he deserves blame. But the difference between the sense of misconduct and the sense of guilt, consists in this, that the latter penetrates much deeper into the heart. It makes the criminal feel, that he is not only blameable, but justly punishable, for the part which he has acted. With reference to this office of conscience, the inspired writers frequently speak of it, in terms borrowed from the awful