the confuse representations of Imagination and Senfe, to be produced for it. But this fhews what Prejudice can do, when an Opinion fo common (as the Affirmative fide of the Queftion is) fhall have fo little ground in Reafon to fupport it, and when Men fhall decide with Precipitation, and at fight upon a Queftion, than which I know none, within the whole Circle of Philofophy that requires a more ftrict Examination.

42. Such indeed I do not pretend to have made in this Difcourfe, which is not defigned as a juft Treatife upon the Subject, but only by way of Effay, to touch upon the chief Things, and to lay them into fuch a Scheme, as to open a View into the right State of the Question, that fo it may appear which fide of it bids faireft for our Approbation. And truly I think that by the Light wherein we have placed it, (as imperfect as it is) any one whofe Eyes are free from the Tincture of Prejudice may now fee, that that Opinion which fuppofes Brutes not to have any Thought or Perception, nor any Principle in them diftinct from Matter, but to be purely Material, and to do what they do, by the advantageous difpofition of Matter and Motion (which is the Cartefian Hypothefis) is by much the more fimple, eafy, fafe and probable. For the poffibility of it being but once admitted, which upon the foregoing Confiderations, I fee not how any reasonable Perfon can deny, the difficulties that lie on H

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the other fides, feem fufficient inducements to incline one to think it true, for indeed the way is perfectly blockt up with impaffable difficulties on both the other fides, the final refult of which among others, will be either to make us as Mortal as the Brutes, as in the mid-way that unites Matter and Thought in thofe Creatures, or else to make them as immortal as our felves, as in the other way that supposes them to think, and to have immaterial Souls, neither of which I presume can fit very eafy upon the Mind of any Man, that can obtain leave of his Prejudices to make a free use of his Thoughts.

43. Should it now at last be objected against the fide we have most favour'd, that if Matter can perform such ftrange Operations, then for ought we know, we our felves may be no more than Machines. To this I answer, that if indeed Matter did Think, then we our felves, notwithstanding our Thinking, might be no more than Machines. Which abfurd confequence as was remark'd before, falls upon thofe of the middle way, who unite Matter and Thought in Brutes, by fuppofing them to have material Souls and yet to Think. But this does no way concern the Cartefian Hypothefis, which only holds that fuch Operations are done by Matter in Brutes, as resemble those which proceed from a Principle of Thought in us. For tho', it follows that if Matter did Think, then we who think may poffibly have

no other Principle in us but what is material, yet it does by no means follow from Matters being able to exert fuch Movements (without Thinking) as Thought produces in us, that therefore we who think may be no more than Matter; that is, in other Words, it does not follow, that becaufe God can fo Mechanize Matter, as to make it capable of doing fome things that correfpond to what we do by Thought, that therefore he can fo Mechanize it as to make it Think. So that we who do Think, and are confcious to our felves that we do, fhould be concluded to be no more than Matter, only because fome other Creatures, who do not think, but only imitate what we do by Thought, are fuppofed to be no more. Tis plain, I fay that there is no ground for this confequence, and confequently no force in the Objection, which, tho' ftrong against those of the middle way, that unite Matter and Thought,does not at all affect the Cartefians, who do not ufe to link together fuch inconfiftent and unfociable Ideas.

44. To conclude now with a Word or two, concerning the Treatment of Beasts. Tho' it is my Opinion, or if you will, my Fancy, that Reafon does moft favour that fide which denies all Thought and Perception to Brutes, and refolves thofe Movements of theirs which seem to carry an appearance of it (because like those which we exert by Thought) into mechanical Principles, yet, after all, left in the Refolution

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folution of so abftruse a Question, our Reason fhould happen to deceive us, as 'tis easy to err in the Dark, I am fo far from incouraging any practices of Cruelty, upon the Bodies of thefe Creatures, which the Lord of the Creation has (as to the moderate and neceffary use of them) subjected to our Power, that on the contrary, I would have them ufed and treated with us much tenderness and pitiful regard, as if they had all that Senfe and Perception, which is commonly (tho' I think without fufficient Reafon) attributed to them. Which equitable Measure, they that think they really have that Perceptlon, ought in perfuance of their own Principle, fo much the more Confcientiously to Ob ferve.

CHAP.

1.

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CHA P. III.

Of THOUGHT.

Aving fhewn at large what it is that thinks in us, I fhould now proceed to inquire How we think; but that I conceive it of fome importance in order to the fuller difplay of the Nature of that Understanding, whofe Account is here undertaken, to premise fome Confiderations concerning THOUGHT it felf. For as the intireness of the Subject makes it necessary to be spoken to, fo the order of the thing feems to require that we should firft confider what Thought or Understanding is, before we confider how we Think, or after what manner we Understand. The whole Theory of Human Understanding being, as I conceive, reduceable to those two general Questions.

2. From what we have difcours'd concerning the Principle of Thought, and the utter incapacity of Matter to think, it appears plain in the general that Thought is an Act of the Mind. But what that Act of the Mind is, which we call Thought, I fhall not pretend exactly to tell, not because, as it happens in fome Cafes, I cannot explain it fo well as I conceive it, and fo fhould rather obscure than define it, but because indeed I do not know.

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