bove the Beasts, and but little lower than the Angels. This is but dry Entertainment to the generality even of ftudious and curious Men, they would rather ftudy Books than Things, and any thing rather than their own Minds, by which means it comes to pass that when they know almost every thing befides, they live in a deep ignorance of themfelves, like those that have travell'd moft parts of the World, and yet are Strangers to their own Country.

6. For I must further remark that 'tis this reflex Thought that teaches us the knowledge of our felves, that Knowledge of our felves which both Pagan and Chriftian Philofophy fo earneftly recommend, and inculcate as the moft useful and important Leffon, that Man has to ftudy. As indeed it truly is, tho' few value it, and most industriously fly from it. But while Philofophers exhort to the Study of it, 'tis Reflection only that teaches it, and that in the School of Solitude and Retirement, which is as little liked as either the Leffon, or the Mitrefs. 'Tis by Reflection that we come to know the true State of Human Nature. enter into our felves, and taking a quiet view of our own intellectual Frame, we learn how 'tis with other Men, as having discover'd in our own Breasts the Springs by which they act, and confequently know how to deal with them. 'Tis by Reflection alfo upon the Operations of our Minds, that we come to find out the way how to dire& them in the research

We

of

of Truth, Logick being the refult of Reflection and of those Observations that are made by it, upon the due or undue ufe of our rational Faculties. But Reflection has also a very friendly Influence upon good Manners, as being that faithful Mirror that fhews a Man himself, and returns to him the Moral State of his Soul, and fo helps him to correct what is amifs there, as also to govern his Thoughts, and to keep a guard over his Paffions. So that in fine when we have used our Thoughts in the direct way, never fo long to make us Learned and Knowing, we must be beholden at last to Reflexion to make us Wife and Good.

SECT. III.

Of Thought of Perception, and Thought of Volition, wherein alfo of Idea and Sentiment.

I.

WE

E were speaking laft of reflex Thought. And when we do indeed reflect upon our Thoughts (which we but feldom have the leifure or the Inclination to do) one of the firft Things we fhall difcover concerning them perhaps will be, that fome of them are in the way of mere Perception, and fome in the way of Volition. Which I take, Which I take, next to that of formal and objective, to be the most general divifion of Thought. Only I was willing to premife that of direct and reflex before it, becaufe 'tis by Reflexion that we come to learn

what

Part II. what the feveral Acts of Thought are which we are confcious of in our felves.

2. How to make thefe Terms (Perception" and Volition) any clearer than they already are, I do not well know, as not pretending to know much more of the things fignified by them, than only to diftinguifh one from the other. And that I can plainly and easily do. Whether I perceive only, or whether I will alfo what I perceive, I plainly difcern that willing is one thing, and perceiving is another. But especially when I only perceive without willing (as I may do, tho' I cannot Will without perceiving) because then the actual feparation fhews the diftinction, which is alfo further confirm'd a Pofteriori from those bodily Movements which follow upon a Thought of Volition, but pay no manner of Obedience to our Perceptions.

3. Perception is either in the way of Idea, or in the way of Sentiment. For even our very Feeling is a fort of Perception, and is ufually fo call'd. Perception in the way of Idea, is when we perceive fomething that is without us, and diftinct from us, even that Idea which is the immediate Object of our Thought. Perception in the way of Sentiment is that inward feeling which we have of our felves, and of the different Manner of our Being, as when we are in Pleasure or in Pain. The former of thefe for diftinction's fake I would call Intellectual or Ideal Perception, and the latter fenfible Perception

ception, or in one Word, Senfation. The dif ference between which may already in great Measure appear, and fhall be more fully laid open hereafter.

4. At prefent I fhall only further remark that Perception, and that in the Ideal way is the only Act of Thought that properly belongs to the Understanding. And because this is one of those Points, upon which the new Philofophy has adventured to divide from the old, it may be worth our while, and not befides the Bufinefs of a Theory, that undertakes to inquire into the manner of Human Underftanding, to touch upon it in a few Refle

xions.

5. The old Philofophy has been fo liberal to the Understanding as to beftow a theefold A&t upon it, viz. Apprehenfion, Judgment, and Difcourse, By Apprehenfion meaning the Simple view or Perception of a Thing. By Judgment the Union or Separation of Things by Affirmation or Negation. And by Difcourfe the deduction of one Thing from another; which threefold Divifion of the intellectual Operation, has furnish'd the Logicians with fo many capital Grounds to proceed upon in their ordinary Systems.

6. But neither the Matter, nor yet the Form of this divifion (as authentick as time and consent have made it) are unobnoxious to juft exception. For firft allowing for the prefent the Matter of it to be right, that is, that

thofe

those three Acts did really belong to the Understanding, yet the Form feems not to proceed according to Art. And that because the third Member in the divifion is contain❜d under the fecond, that which they call Difcourfe being only a mediate Judgment, and differing from Judgment at large no otherwife than as a Conclufion differs from a Propofition, as being only the judging a Thing to be fo, or fo, for fuch a Reafon. And I hope judging will be never the lefs, judging for having a Reason for it.

7. But the Matter of this Divifion, will perhaps be found to be as faulty as the Form. For Judgment and Difcourfe, or to fpeak more collectively, Judgment (the latter being only a Species of the former) feems rather to belong to the Will, than to the Understanding, as being nothing else but that affent or diffent which the Will gives to what the Understanding perceives, or feems to perceive, by affirming or denying, that is, embracing or refusing what is propofed, according to the apparent Evidence wherewith it comes. For why may there not be a willing and a nilling that belongs to Truth as well as that which refpects good? And what is Judgment but that Act of the Will which refpects Truth, not as defiring fuch a Thing to be true (for fo it must be confider'd as good) but as acquiefcing or confenting that it is fo. And indeed if the Will be the fubject of Error, as it seems rea

fonable