in the view of fome other Idea applied as a common Measure to both. The difference between which two ways of knowing the Relations of Ideas, I cannot more briefly and fenfibly illuftrate than by Lines, which we find to be equal, either by comparing them with themselves, or, in cafe one of them be inacceffible to the other, with a Third, by their agreement to which it appears that they agree among themselves. According to that well known Rule, Que conveniunt eidem tertio, conveniunt inter fe. Which Rule feems to have the clearness of a Principle, tho' that which is known by it to be confider'd as a conclufion, and may ferve to let us fee that all Demonftration refolves at laft into Intuition.

8. This Difcourfive or Demonstrative Knowledge is that which the Schools have been pleafed to fignalize and dignify with the Name of Science, which they peculiarly apply to that knowledge which is acquired by Demonstration, according to that faying of theirs, Demonftration begets Science, which accordingly is confider'd as the effect of it. And indeed it is fo, and for that reafon demonftrative Knowledge is truly and properly Science. But why it fhould be call'd Emphatically by that Name, and the word Science appropriated to it, is not very obvious to my Understanding. For Science is but the Latin word for Knowledge, and Knowledge in the formality of it, can mean only the Percep tion of Truth, or of thofe Relations of agree

Part II. ment or disagreement that are between Ideas, which whoever clearly and rightly perceives, is truly faid to know. But that this be done mediately or immediately feems not to be of the general reafon of Knowledge, but to belong rather to the difference and distinction of it, as that which divides the Genus, and conftitutes the Species that are under it. If then there be a Perception of Truth, whether it be mediate or immediate, whether it be perceiv'd as a Conlufion or as a Principle, whether in the Intuitive, or in the Difcourfive way, there is Science or Knowledge. Intuition then is as truly Science, as that which is acquired by Demonstration, and what I know as a Principle without any labour or formality of Proofs, I know as properly and as well as the best demonftrated Conclufion. Indeed I know it better, as feeing it in a more clear, because more immediate Light. For which reafon let a conclufion be never fo well demonstrated, it never fhines with the Brightness of a Principle. As indeed 'tis impoffible it fhould, fince its Evidence is derived from it, and does at length refolve into it. Besides when all's done, that Demonftrative Knowledge, which the Schools have honour'd with the Name of Science, notwithstanding the great Things that are faid of it, and the ambitious pretences that are every where made to it, will at length appear to be an imperfect kind of Knowledge, and to be founded upon the imperfection of our Understand

ings, which by reafon of their narrow capacity not being always able to perceive the Relations of Ideas by themselves, are forced to have recourse to fome other common Measure, as a weak or dim Eye is fain to use the affiftance of a Glafs, which tho' a great help to the Eye, is yet no great Commendation of its Sight. And accordingly the Schools themfelves have thought fit to remove this discourfive kind of Knowledge, as an Imperfection from the more perfect Beings, as well as from him that is abfolutely fo, and in lieu of it to fubftitute (as better becoming the dignity of their Natures) that which is Intuitive, which by this they feem to fuppofe to be, what indeed it is, the moft perfect and excellent way of Knowing, as afcribing it to God and Angels. But then why a particular Species, and that too the leaft perfect, fhould carry away the Name of the whole kind, as if it were the only Knowledge, or at least the more excellent of the two, when indeed it is neither, I leave to the confideration of the Men of Art, as a thing that seems to want a better Account than I can presently give of it.

9. The Sum is, Knowledge confifts in the fole view and perception of Truth, and the clearer that view is, ftill the more perfect is the Knowledge. And confequently if any Knowledge fhould be call'd by way of Eminence by the Name of Science, methinks it ought to have been that of Intuition. But to prevent Confufion

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Part II. fion and Mistake, perhaps 'twere better if the School would consent to have them both enjoy the Name of Science in common, and to be diftinguish'd from each other by the mediateness or immediateness of it. It being most reasonable that things fhould be diftinguish'd by that wherein they differ, and not by that wherein they agree. As indeed they both do in this. For whether mediate or immediate 'tis all Knowledge whatever we clearly perceive, the mediateness or immediateness not belonging to the Effence, but to the fpecification and diftin&tion of it. 'Tis true indeed all Knowledge must be immediate or mediate indeterminately, so that whatever a Man knows, he must know in the one or the other of these two ways; but that it should be determinately one or the other feems no way neceffary, the Notion of Knowledge being fully completed in the perception of Truth, always provided that it be a clear and diftinct perception; which gives us occafion to enter upon another Confideration of Thought, that will open to us the next Section.

SECT. VI.

Of clear and confufe Thought, with fome incidental Strictures upon the Criterium of Truth,

I.

C

Learnefs of Thought, tho' not in fuch popular Eftimation as fome other things, because of the exceeding fewness of them that

are

are either Masters or Judges of it, and fo not fo well answering the ends of thofe illiberal Students who court Popularity more than Truth, is yet certainly the greatest Excellency and Perfection of the Understanding. For the greatest perfection of any Faculty must be to operate in the moft perfect manner, as that Sight is moft perfect that fees best. And the most perfect manner of Understanding muft be to have the most clear conception of things, as again that Sight fees beft that fees moft clearly. For the clearer the Perception is, ftill the more there is of Perception, and confequently of Knowledge, that confifting, as was fhewn, in the Perception of Truth.

2. The goods of the Mind are of all others the most unduly valued. Intellectual Accomplishments are generally fet at a higher rate than Moral, and of Intellectual thofe that confift in the Extensiveness of Thought carry it in the publick Vogue before thofe that confift in the Intensiveness of it. To have an insight into a great deal, tho' but confuse and fuperficial (fo fond are Men even of the fhadow of Univerfal Knowledge) is reckon'd a great Atchievement by fome, and for that reafon as ambitiously affected by others, who are for skimming over the Surfaces of a great many things, without going to the bottom of any thing, like thofe who prefer a general Acquaintance before an intimate Friendship. But would thefe Men think it a Commendarion of their Eye-fight to

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fee