Part II. (which is that we mean by contrary to Reason) we may fafely conclude that it cannot be. And as 'tis impoffible that God fhould reveal any fuch thing to us, as the Object of our Faith, fo if any fuch thing fhould be proposed to us as reveal'd by God, we ought rather to reject the Revelation, than to admit the thing, it being more poffible that the Revelation fhould be falfe, that is, that fuch a thing fhould not be reveal'd by God, than that what we evidently perceive by thofe Faculties which he has given us, as falfe and impoffible, fhould be true. Which equally concludes against the Socinian on the one hand, and against the Papist on the other. SEC T. VII. Of abstract and concrete Thought, with fome Remarks upon the usefulness of Abstraction for the greater clearness and extent of Thought. 1. A Bftraction being an Affection belonging to Thought, 'tis fit it fhould have a place among the Divifions of it. And fince it has fuch an advantageous fubferviency to its clearness (as in the fequel will be fhewn) it may be very proper to annex the confideration of it to the foregoing. We have occafionally touch'd upon this already, and therefore fhall be the fhorter in our ftay upon it, intending only a few Reflections of more important and less ob vious confideration, and for the reft referring those who would be more particularly inform'd to the common Syftems, for their fuller Satiffaction. 2. That Abstraction is not the denying one thing of another, or the mental feparating one thing from another, any otherwife than by the confidering or thinking upon one thing without confidering or thinking upon another; I need not advise those who are acquainted with the Scholaftick use of this word. But then for the exacter understanding of this, it may be convenient further to note, that this feparate confideration wherein the 'Nature of Abftraction is made to confift, is to be understood, not of different Beings, but of the parts of the fame Being, that is, Abstraction is not the confidering one intire and complete Being without another (for they being numerically, at leaft diftinct, cannot be confider'd otherwife, fince one Idea will not include them) but the confidering one part of fuch a Being without another. 3. But further, Abftraction is not of fuch parts neither as are really and phyfically diftinct, fuch as we commonly call Integral Parts (for I fuppofe I fhould not properly be faid to abftract in confidering one part of a Human Body, or one part of a Number without confidering another, fince thefe, tho' physical parts, are yet logical wholes, and fo the feparate confideration of them would be no proper Abftra Яtion) but of parts that are intelligibly distinct, and have a real famenefs in the Nature of the thing. When one of thefe really fame, but intelligibly diftinct parts is confider'd without the other, or without that real whole whofe intelligible part it is, then is my Thought abftract; but when there is no fuch feparate confideration, but all is included together in one Idea, and confider'd as really it is, then is my Thought concrete. So that in fhort, Abstraction, as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought, is the confidering one thing without another, not abfolutely, but in things that are not really one without the other, nor yet really deniable one of the other. For Abftraction is, as it were, the drawing of a thing away from it self. But where things are really feparate or diftinct, the confidering them apart is not Abstraction, but only a mere divided Confideration; nor would the joining them in one be Concretion, but Confufion. 4. Abstraction then is the feparate confideration of things intelligibly diftinct, really indiftinct. And of this there are, as I conceive, two forts, one in the way of Modality, and another in the way of Habitude, according to the different Intelligibility that one and the fame thing has, either as 'tis confider'd according to the different manners of Being which it has in it felf, or according to the different Respects which it carries to other things. In the way of Modality, as when a Subftance is confi der'd ค der'd without its Mode, or fometimes according to one Mode only, and fometimes according to another. In the way of Habitude, as when a thing is confider'd not throughout as it is in it felf, but only fo far as it agrees, or according to what it has in common with other things. As to give an inftance of each, which will ferve to illuftrate the Doctrine of Abstra&tion in general, as well as thefe particular kinds of it. A Mathematician confiders Body sometimes according to the Dimension of length only without attending to any breadth, and then he calls it a Line; fometimes according to length and breadth without attending to Profundity, and then he calls it a Surface; and fometimes again according to all three Dimenfions, and then he calls it a Solid. This is Abftraction in the way of Modality or Manner. Again, the fame Mathematician having before him a Figure terminated with three right Lines, confiders it fometimes throughout, according to the full specifick extent of it, as 'tis diftinct from all other Figures, and then he calls it a Triangle. But fometimes again he confiders it no further than according to what it has in common with the reft, and then he calls it a Figure. This is Abstraction in the way of Habitude. And it may here deferve to be remarked, that this Abstraction is the ground of thofe common and more extenfive Conceptions which we call Generals or Univerfals. Concerning which I should have here a proper occafion to fpeak, Part II. fpeak, were I not too much prevented by our common Logick, which my design is not to repeat, but to fupply. 5. The Foundation of Abstraction (as I noted before) is the various Intelligibility of the fame thing, according to the feveral Faces or Appearances of it to the View of the Mind that contemplates it. This lays a ground for Abstraction, and you may call it, if you please, for that reafon, the Abftrahibility of a thing, as being that which makes it capable of being abftractly confider'd. But the occafion of Abftraction is the Infirmity of our Minds, which not being able, by reafon of the narrowness of their capacity, to comprehend things that have this various Intelligibility, or intelligible Compofition, as I might have call'd it, in one intire View, is forced to confider them inadequately or partially, fometimes in one intelligible part, and fometimes in another, till at length it comes to have as clear a Perception of the whole, as this metaphyfical Anatomy can give. 6. For it is here further to be observ'd, that this abstract and feparate way of Confideration, or, as I may fay, Diffection of things, tho' it be occafion'd by the Infirmity of the Understanding (for which reafon a perfect intelligence can have no need of it) is yet a great help to it in Contemplation, as ferving to make its View of things more clear and diftinct. As Spectacles, tho' in him that ufes them they argue weak nefs |