nefs of Sight, yet when used they do very much affift the Act of Vifion.

7. For befides that our Understandings (as great an Opinion as we may have of them) are beft fuited to the Contemplation of little Objects, and we can be more curious and exact in the furvey of a little at a time, than of a great deal; especially in things of a very compounded Nature, and that have a great Latitude of Intelligibility, as a Man can more easily count and multiply great Numbers by their parts than by their wholes; I fay, befides this advantage of Abftraction in leffening and contracting the Object, and fo making it more proportionate to our Capacities, 'tis further to be confider'd that by that separate confideration of one intelligible part from another, which wę call Abstraction, feveral diftinctions of things do arife which are very neceffary to the improvement of Knowledge; for we are led to look upon those things as (intelligibly at least) diftinct from one another, which we can confider one without the other. And those distinЄtions ferve us not only for the clearer Explanation of the thing it felf, whofe diftinctions they are, but also as Principles whereon to erect other Conclufions of great importance to be known, and otherwife perhaps indiscoverable. As may be gather'd from the inftance of Refection and Refraction, the clear Reason and Doctrine of which is founded upon the abftract and diftinct confideration of Motion in

し

general from the particular determination of it, and was never rightly understood in the World, till that diftinction was made.

8. Besides, as Abstraction ferves to the greater clearness and diftinctness of Thought, fo alfo the greater inlargement of it, as rendring our Ideas more general and extenfive. Which is a great help to us in thinking; for things as they are being all fingular, and fingulars being in a manner infinite, we should find our narrow Faculties ftrangely incumber'd, nay even opprefs'd in the confideration of them, if we did not abbreviate and contract them by ranging them into certain general Orders or Sorts; that is, if we had not certain abstract Ideas, in which a great many of them agree, and fo may be faid to be contain'd under them. As for inftance, when we confider an equilateral Triangle, only as a Triangle, or a Triangle as a Figure, &c. In all which kind of Abstractions this is to be obferv'd, that tho' the inferiour degree contains the fuperior in it, with some further determination of its own, yet the fuperior contains the inferior under it; fo that tho' the inferior contains actually more, yet the fuperior, as being lefs determin'd, reprefents more, and fo contributes to the greater inlargement and extensiveness of Thought; the further confideration of which Matter I leave to the Logicians.

SECT,

SECT. VIII.

Of pure and impure Thought, with fome Account of the difference between pure Intellect and Imagination.

I.

TH

"His diftinction of Thought into pure and impure, is not here of a Moral, as by the found it may feem, but of a Metaphyfical importance. And according to this confideration of it, the Schools have applied it to the Will, and fome of the modern Philofophers to the Understanding. That Act of the Will in the fenfe of the School, is faid to be pure which is perfectly voluntary, without any mixture of nilling, when a Man only Wills, as in the love of that which is fimply good, fuppofe Health. And that may be faid to be impure or mixt, which is partly voluntary, and partly involuntary; voluntary abfolutely or upon the whole, but fecundum quid, or in a certain refpect involuntary, or against the inclination of the Will. When a Man wills and nills the fame at once, tho' in different refpects, willing it from without or upon an extrinfick confideration, and nilling it from within or from the intrinfick nature of the thing, as in the chufing of a leffer Evil for the avoiding of a greater, fuppofe Phyfick for the avoiding of Sickness. This may be faid to be pure and impure Thought, with refpect to the Will.

N 2

2. But

2. But I fhall here confider it chiefly with respect to the Understanding. And in this regard, I call that a pure Thought or Perception whofe Object is immaterial or fpiritual; and that an impure Thought, whofe Object is material or corporeal. This, as understood of the ultimate Object of Thought, viz. the things thought upon, is fufficiently plain without any further Explanation, the diftinction of things into material and immaterial being both clear and confefs'd. All the difficulty will be how to accommodate this to the immediate Object of Thought, that is, to Ideas, they being all immaterial. Now here 'tis to be confider'd (what has been formerly noted) that we may distinguifh of a twofold Being in Ideas, the Real Being, and the Ideal Being, or that we may diftinguish them either as effentially, or as reprefentatively confider'd. The reafon of which diftinction is because there is fomething in God, and confequently of the divine Nature (becaufe every thing that is in God, is really no other than He himself) that does not reprefent God, but fomething that is not God, and that indeed is out of him, By which means it comes to pafs that what it reprefents is dif ferent from what it really is, and confequently that the fame Idea as effentially differs from it felf as reprefentatively confider'd.

3. Now as Ideas, though they are all Divine effentially, and as to the reality of the thing, as being of the Effence of God, yet they are not

all

all fo representatively confider'd, as not reprefenting him but Creatures. And accordingly they are Ideas of Creatures, and not Ideas of God; and God fees Creatures, not himself in them. So in like manner, and for the fame reason, tho' all Ideas are spiritual and immaterial, really and effentially, yet they are not all fo representatively, as not all of them representing Spirit, but fome of them Extension or Matter. Some Ideas indeed are spiritual and immaterial, not only according to their real Being (for fo they are all) but alfo according to their ideal or representative Being. But others are fo only according to their real Being, being indeed effentially fpiritual, because they are of the Effence of God, who is a Spirit, and the Father of Spirits; but not reprefenting Spirit, but Matter, and fo are fpiritual in the fame fenfe only as the Idea of a Creature is Divine, that is, effentially only, not reprefentatively. Notwithstanding then the real fpirituality of our Ideas as to their abfolute Effence, they may however relatively be confider'd; and as to their reprefentative Being, be faid to be fome material, and fome immaterial, according to the different Nature or Quality of that thing (Body or Spirit) which they reprefent. That Idea then which represents a spiritual Being to our Minds, is with us a fpiritual Idea, and fo that Idea which represents any thing material, how spiritual foever it may otherwife be as to the reality of its abfolute Effence, is yet in our N 3

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