"does fo ftrongly affect Naturalifts and Ma"thematicians, that they oftentimes forget all "their Duties to contemplate it. If a Ma"thematician has fo much delight when he

compares bigneffes among themselves there"by to difcover their Relations, that he often "facrifices his Pleasures and his Health to find

out the properties of a Line: What applica"tion would not Men beftow upon the Re"fearch of the properties of their own Being, "and a Being infinitely more noble than Bodies? "What Pleasure would they not take in com"paring among themselves by a clear view of "the Understanding fo many different Modi"fications, whereof the bare fentiment, how66 ever feeble and confufe, does fo ftrange<< ly bufie and imploy them? For thou must "know that the Soul contains in her felf all "that thou feeft fine or beautiful in the World, "and which thou art wont to attribute to the "Objects that environ thee. Those Colours, "thofe Odours, thofe Savours, with an infi"nity of other Sentiments wherewith thou "haft not yet been touch'd, are no other than "Modifications of thy own Substance. That "Harmony which fo raises thee, is not in the "Air which ftrikes the Ear; and thofe infi"nite Pleafures (whereof the greatest Volup"tuaries have but a feeble Sentiment) are all "included in the capacity of thy Soul. But <l now if thou hadft a clear Idea of thy felf, "if thou didft fee in me that Archetypal "Spirit

"Spirit, upon which thou waft form'd, thou "would'st discover fo many Beauties, and fo

66

many Truths in contemplating it, that thou "would't neglect all thy Devoirs. Thou "would'st discover with an extream Joy, that “thou would'st be capable of enjoying an "infinity of Pleafures. Thou woud't have a "clear knowledge of their Nature; thou "would't be inceffantly comparing them among themfelves, and thou would't difcover "Truths which would appear to thee fo worthy of thy Application, that wholly wrapt up and abforpt in the Contemplation of they own Being; full of thy felf, of thy Gran"dure, of thy Excellency, and of thy Beau66 ty, thou would'st be no longer able to think "of any thing befides. But my Son, God has

not made thee to think of nothing but thy felf. "He has made thee for Himfelf. Wherefore I "fhall not difcover to thee the Idea of thy "Being, till that happy time when the view "of the Effence of thy God himself fhall de"face and eclipfe all thy Beauties, and make "thee defpife all that thou art, that thou "may'ft think only of contemplating Him.

Happy Time indeed, when we fhall know both God and our felves, and our felves in God, whofe fuperlative Beauty will not fuffer us to grow proud of our own. Then may we be trufted with the Knowledge of our felves, without any danger of being puffed up by it, when that glorious Effence, wherein we shall SA

take

Part II. take a view of our felves, is fo infinitely_tranfcending all that we have, or are in our felves: Now our feeble Eyes would be dazzled with our own Light, and we fhould fall in Love with the dear Image of our own Being; but when the Looking-glafs fhall be fo much more charmingly beautiful than the Face, we may then fecurely behold our felves in it. In the mean time let us efteem that the best Knowledge of our felves to have a deep fense of our Infirmities, and not be afham'd of that Igno

St. Auguft. Con

fef. Lib. 10. Cap.

5.

rance which is the Guardian of our Humility. Confitear ergo quid de me Sciam, Confitear & quid de me Nefciam. Quoniam &quod de me Scio, te mihi lucente Scio, & quod de me Nefcio, tam diu Nefcio, donec fiant tenebra mea ficut Meridies in Vultu tuo.

CHA P. IV.

An Entrance upon the Explication of the manner of our Thinking, containing a General Diftribution of Intelligible Objects into their feveral kinds.

1.

T

HE whole Theory of Humane Understanding, as Extenfive as it is, feems commodioufly reducible to thefe two general Questions. What Thought is, and how,

or

or after what manner we think or understand. Of the former of thefe we have by God's Affiftance already given a large and particular Account; fo particular, that I think I may fay, we have, as it were, feparated the parts of Thought by Section, and read a Metaphyfical, fhall I call it, or Anatomical Lecture upon every part, in order to a more accurate Comprehenfion of the whole. Let us advance now by the favourable Aid, and, as we humbly hope, under the propitious Conduct of him who has brought us hitherto, to the confideration of what remains, viz. to inquire into the manner how we think or underftand, and fee whether we can render a true, or at least, an intelligible Account of that great Arcanum in Philofophy, which is fo very neceffary, and has been fo long wanting, to the knowledge of our felves, which indeed is the best Knowledge; and fuch, as in this refpect, has the advantage of all other Sciences, in that while they elevate us above Men, this ferves to humble us before God.

2. But now when I pretend to explain, or rather to make inquiry how we think, my meaning is not how we perform that Intellectual Operation, which we call Thought. Not but that this is very proper to be confider'd in this Theory, which indeed is not abfolutely Perfect and Intire without it. But I profefs my self at prefent utterly uncapable of giving any account of this Matter; and find

ing no improvement upon any Application of my Mind to it, have reafon to think I fhall always fo continue, which obliges me to intreat my Reader to accept of our Theory without it; and either to excufe this unavoidable Defect, or to fupply it. For my own part I cannot do it, and therefore in pretending to inquire how we Think, my meaning precifely and determinately is, what it is which by it felf terminates our Understanding, or is the immediate Object of our Thought. For tho' every thing that truly is,be fome way or other Intelligible, and fo the Object of Thought, (intelligibility being an Affection belonging to Being as fuch) yet every Being does not terminate our Thought by it felf, and fo is not the immediate Object of it; which implies again that there are fome things which are fo, which indeed will be found to be true, fome things being intelligible immediately by themfelves. For which reafon in attempting to explain the manner of Humane Understanding, I chufe rather to inquire what is the immediate Object of our Thought, than whence we have our Ideas, or what thofe Ideas are whereby we understand, or the like; For tho' all our Ideas are immediate Objects of Thought, yet all the immediate Objects of our Thought are not Ideas, there being fome things which, as we fhall fee, are Intelligible without them. So that immediate Object of Thought is fomething larger than Idea; and I am willing here to exprefs the manner of Understand