Ideas are neither concreated, nor yet occafionally created, it follows that they are not created at all, which was the Point to be proved in the whole.

7. This Argument proceeds from the removal of all the Species to the removal of the Kind, that is, from fhewing the Abfurdity of fuppofing our Ideas to be Created by God, thus, or thus, to the Abfurdity of fuppofing them to be Created by him at all. But there is a fhorter and more demonftrative way of proving this general Conclufion, that our Ideas are not Created by God, and that is, because they are not in themselves of a creable Nature. Were they at all Created, I fhould not doubt to attribute the Creation of them to God, as thinking it more reasonable that they should be his Creatures than ours. But indeed they are not at all Created, nor at all capable of being fo, and that for the reafon before-mentioned, because they are Neceffary, Eternal and Immutable, which no Creature can poffibly be, as involving in it both Novelty, Contingency, and Mutability of Being. Mutability, because the Omnipotent Caufe that gives it Being, cannot want Power to change the manner of it. Contingency, because God being abfolutely Perfect in himself, and fufficient for his own Happinefs, cannot be under any neceffity of ducing any thing out of himself, and fo the Creature cannot be a neceffary Emanation from him. And laftly, Novelty of Being, and that

pro

because

because to Create being to produce out of nothing, it must be of the reafon of Creation that not Being should go before Being, or that what is Created fhould firft be nothing, or firft not be, and confequently if it ever be, it must begin to be, and fo cannot be Eternal. Creation then is inconfiftent with Eternity, and confequently, that which is Eternal cannot be Created. And accordingly for this Reafon it is. that we may conclude the Generation of the World not to be a proper Creation, because it is Eternal; and foalfo the Word itself may be concluded not to be a Creature, but truly and ef fentially God; for the fame Reason, even as fome of the ancient Fathers are obferved to have argued.

CHA P.

That the Ideas whereby we understand are not the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls. Or that the Mind does not perceive things by Contemplating her own Perfections or Mo

I.

dalities.

WE

E have now made a confiderable Progrefs in the fearch of those Ideas whereby we understand, which we have fought both far and near,both at home and abroad,and there remain now not many Fields more which we have not beaten. But before we go any further, let us return once more to ourselves, and fee whether the Mind needs any thing else but it felf for the Perception of Objects, whether it does not perceive them in itself,or if you will by itself, by confidering or contemplating the Perfections of her own Effence, and fo whether thofe Perfections may not be the Ideas whereby we understand. Perhaps after all this it may be, and therefore let this be our next Enquiry, left, as it happens in fome other cafes, we feek that intellectual Light abroad which we have in our felves; like the Man who with a great deal of care and diligent Circumfpecti

on

on looks about after the Candle which he has all the while upon his own Head.

2. This indeed is very much our cafe in the Business of Senfation. Here we are either fo ignorant or fo forgetful of our felves as to imagine that Heat, that Sweetnefs, that Colour (with other fenfible Qualities as they are call'd) to be fomething really inherent in the things that are without us, which indeed are only in our felves, as being no other than certain Modifications of our own Spirits, existing sometimes in one State or Manner of Being, and fometimes in another. For indeed (fo great is the Capacity of our Souls) our Sensations are all within our felves, and there it is that the Mind really perceives them, tho' by a confuse and falfe Judgment, fhe is apt to fancy that the perceives them in the Objects that are about her. But she cannot perceive them where they are not. She perceives them therefore in her felf, and that because they are of a very different Nature from our Ideas, as representing nothing to the Mind that is without, refembling themfelves, and as being indeed no other than Modifications of the Mind itself, as Mr. Malebranche well remarks. Here therefore we need go no further than our felves, and that because they are of our felves, and in our felves, and even our very felves, as being only modaliy diftinct from us: For Pleasure and Pain, &c. differ no otherwise from us, than as we our felves in one State or Manner of Being differ from

Our

Part II. our felves in another State or Manner of Being. As to our Sensations then the Cafe is clear that they are all in the Soul itself, and there it is that we are to look for them, and not go abroad for that which we have at home, or feek our felves out of our felves. And here, if any where, that of the Poet is of remarkable importance.

Ne te Quafiveris extrà.

But now whether it be fo as to our Ideas which reprefent fomething answerable and correfponding to them out of the Mind; that is, whether these Ideas be in the Mind as our Senfations are (for that they are in fome fenfe in the Mind, as being the immediate Objects of it, is readily granted) that is, whether they are the Perfections of it; fo that we need only confult our felves, or the feveral effential Degrees of our own Being to reprefent things to us that are without us, and fo may be faid to perceive things in our felves, and to fee by our own Light, is quite another Question, and that because our Ideas are very different from our Senfations.

3. 'Tis true indeed, that this is the most perfect and most independent way of Understanding. And therefore if no lefs than that will content us, and we have fo much of the Luciferian Ambition, as to afpire to be like to the moft High, we cannot take a more compendious or effectual method to compafs it, than by affum