CHA P. XII.

Wherein is confidered what Reasons there are to think that the Divine Ideas are actually the Ideas whereby we underftand. With fome explanatory Account of this Ideal Syftem.

i.

Is no fmall fatisfaction to a penfive Traveller after he has wandered up and down through wild Deserts and Pathlefs Woods, and has in vain attempted many cragged Hills and inacceffible Rocks and Precipices, at length to fall into a paffable way, tho' he knows not yet whether it will lead him, or whether it be the right way or no. To apply this to our present Cafe, I need only fay, that after fome tryal made upon the feveral Hypothefes of Humane Understanding, we have at length found one that is Poffible and Intelligible, which is more than can be faid of any of the reft, and what, after so many vain and fruitless Enquiries, may be lookt upon as a confiderable Atchievement. I do not mean in respect of my own Abilities fo as to value my felf as a Difcoverer, but in refpect of the thing itself, it being indeed a very confiderable and chearing thing to meet with anyLight after fo muchDarkness,tho' it be only the glimpse of a poffibility. And fo much indeed I fhall not doubt to affirm, that we have found;

but

but whether this way of Understanding which we affirm to be poffible, be the very actual way whereby we understand, is a Question that is not to be determin'd without that Modesty and Referve which is due both to the Sublimity of the Argument, and the Infirmity of him that handles it.

2. There is a twofold Reserve which is to be ufed in our fpeculative Researches. One that refpects the Things that we have under Confideration, and another that refpects that degree of Affent wherewith we adhere to them. That which concerns the Things themselves, is that we don't outer la matiere (as the French speak) push things too far, over ftretch the Matter, or indulge our inquifitive Humour too much about things that are greatly removed from us, or much above us, and that lie in the Dark; but that we govern our Curiofity within reasonable Bounds, contenting ourselves with being Wife unto Sobriety. That Referve which concerns our Affent, is again capable of being confidered two ways, ift. That we forbear giving it to any thing but what is clear and evident, fince every thing that has the appearance of Truth, is not always true. 2dly. That when we do inwardly give it, as finding it reasonable fo to do, we use not however any undue Freedom in the manner of expreffing our Affent, by being too Pofitive or Dogmatical in our Affirmations, which favours of too much Confidence and E e 4 Reliance

* That is abfo

lutely.

Reliance upon our own Judgments, and is therefore in decency to be avoided, tho' we think ourselves never fo much in the right. I have endeavour'd to govern myself by thefe meafures in this Theory, and I hope this is the Temper which I have hitherto ufed; and I must ftrangely forget myself and my Argument too, fhould I now in this Part of it begin to difcontinue it; and therefore tho' we have been fomewhat pofitive in affirming the fimple poffibility of our Understanding by the Divine Ideas (because indeed I think 'tis very clear that we may fo understand) yet that we actually do underftand by them, I fhall not take upon me abfolutely to affirm. The Question How we underftand, is too difficult and abftrufe to be peremptorily decided by me, or by any Man elfe. I pretend only to examine which of all the conceivable ways of it appears to be most reasonable, which is enough to answer the design of a modeft Theory, and to fatisfie all reasonable Curiofity either in the Writer or in the Reader. And accordingly having fhewn it to be abfolutely poffible that we may understand by the Divine Ideas; I now proceed to confider what rational Grounds and Inducements there are to think that we do actually fo understand.

3. To fet out then, the first rational Ground that may be offer'd for this way of Understanding, is,because all other ways that we can think of appear upon a fair examination to be falfe and impoffible. We have fhewn that it is not rea

fonable

fonable to think there are any Ideas but the Divine Ideas; and fuppofing that there were, yet that we do not understand by them, nay, that they cannot be the Ideas whereby we underftand. And we have further fhewn not only that there are Divine Ideas, but that there is a poffibility of our understanding by them. But then fince the other ways are falfe,whether that alone be not fufficient to conclude this to be true, especially since it appears otherwife to be poffible.For as we argued in the Chap.foregoing after this manner, This way is poffible, therefore no other is necessary; fo whether we may not now as well argue thus; the other ways of understanding are impoffible, therefore this is neceffary, is what I fhould think deferves to be well weighed by every Reader that is not in too much hafte to confider.

4. The Traveller who by confulting his Map, or otherwife is competently fatisfied that the way to fuch a Place muft lie within the compafs of five Roads, and afterwards upon trial finds four of them not to be paffable, has he not great reafon to conclude without any further enquiry,that the fifth which remains is the right, efpecially if he perceives it to lie open and fair? But now how does our Cafe differ from his, and if he may fo conclude, then why may not we? For the Syllogifm would be no other than this. The Ideas whereby we understand, must be either fuchas come from external Objects, or fuch as are produced by ourselves, or created by God,

or

Part II Or the Essential Perfections or Modalities of our Own Souls, or laftly the Divine Ideas. But they are not any of the former; therefore they are the last: Which Conclufion being as true as the Premifes, whoever will not fubmit to it, ftands oblig'd to fhew, either that there is fome other way of understanding which we have not mention'd, and fo that our Enumeration is not juft; or that one of the other which we have mention'd may poffibly be it. And indeed I do not well perceive how either of thefe can be done; and therefore the Argument must be allow'd, or at leaft I fee not how it can b anfwer'd.

5. This laft Argument proceeds from the exclufion or removal of other ways to the pofition of this as the only way of understanding that remains, and indeed that is poffible. But now to argue more nearly from the Nature of the thing itself. The Ideas whereby we under stand are Neceffary, Eternal and Immutable: But there are no Ideas fo qualified but the Divine; therefore the Ideas whereby we underftand are the Divine Ideas. This Argument we have already used upon another occafion, viz, to fhew that our Ideas are neither produced by ourselves, nor created by God, nor yet the Perfections or Modalities of our own Souls. But it is as applicable to this purpose to fhew what they are, as well as what they are not, to fhew them to be Divine, as well as not to be any thing Created; for 'tis, I think very plain,

that