or by participation, and that intellectual Pleafure is when the Soul is primarily affected, and the Body fecundarily or by participation (the Soul being the only true percipient in both) but in this, that fenfual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, upon the occafion of fome motion or alteration in it, whereas intellectual Plea fure is that which the Soul perceives immediately by it felf without any fuch occafion from the Body.

48. But to carry our Principle one step further, if Matter cannot think, then we may fecurely determine thus far concerning the Souls of Brutes, that if they are Matter then they can have no Thought, not even the leaft Senfation properly fo call'd; or if they have any Thought or Senfation, then they are not Matter. So then either they are not Matter, or if they are, then they do not think. Or thus, either they do not think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. Thus far in the general is clear, and confequently no room left for any middle Hypothefis that fhall pretend to come between the two Extremes. But which of the Extremes themselves bids fairest for the Right, requires more particular Confideration, which for our own and the Reader's Refreshment, we shall adjourn to the following Chapter.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

A Digreffion concerning the Souls of Brutes, whether they have any Thought or Senfation in them or no?

I.

"T

O thofe that have been accuftom'd to judge of Things according to the Appearances of Senfe, this will feem a very strange Question; and fhould it happen to be determin'd in the Negative, that perhaps would be thought yet a ftranger Anfwer. But 'tis to be remember'd, that fenfible Prepoffeffions are the greatest Prejudice we have to contend with in our Search of Truth; and I am so far from addreifing the enfuing Reflections to those that are govern'd by them, that I think they are not fit to be confulted with, much less to fit Judges upon fuch an Enquiry as this, in which nothing but the chaft Answers of pure and uncorrupted Reafon, is to be regarded. Thefe therefore I fhall only attend, as the proper Measures by which this Matter is to be concluded; and if, following the Light of clear Reafon, I fhould happen to determine any thing against Senfe, I fhall, I believe, find my felf inclined rather to despise that Objection, than to change my Measure, or renounce my Guide.

2. Not

2. Not that I pretend to give a pofitive and abfolute Determination upon this Question. I do not think it poffible to be done with any certainty on either fide, unless we were better acquainted with the inward Natures and Effences of Things than we are; for upon this the Point will be found to turn, both as to the thing it felf, and as to our Knowledge of it. For as whether Brutes think or no, muft depend upon their Natures, fo our Knowledge of this must in like manner depend upon our Knowledge of thofe Natures. And therefore fince we do not precisely know what kind of Natures or Effences God has beftow'd upon thefe Creatures, 'tis impoffible (without a Divine Revelation of that) we should be able to tell with certainty whether they do think or no. Something indeed may be determin'd, ex Hypotheft, according to what we have already intimated, as that if they are Matter then they cannot think, or, if they do think, then they are not Matter, becaufe Matter has been proved uncapable of Thought; but as to the abfolute iffue of the Queftion, that, I think, we can hardly make any definitive Judgment of; only there may be greater Probabilities on one fide than on the other, and which of them it is that feems to carry the most rational Appearance, fhall be our prefent Business briefly and impartially to confider.

3.This is a Subject of a vaft Latitude, and much may be faid upon it, but I think the whole Area

of

of the Queftion may be comprised within three Suppofitions: For either the Souls of Beafts are Matter and fo do not think; or else they do think, and fo are not Matter; or else they are both material and thinking. Which Suppofitions, because they contain the full ftate of the Question, we will for more distinction's fake confider as fo many different Opinions concerning it.

4. The two first Opinions agree in this common Principle, That Matter cannot think. And confequently, that if the Souls of Beasts are Matter, then they do not think, or if they do think then they are not Matter. They confent in the general, that Matter and Thought cannot confift together, and fo that they cannot be both material and thinking, and divide only upon the particular fide which they are to determine for, viz. whether they are Matter, and do not think, or, whether they do think, and are not Matter.

5. One of these Opinions fupposes that the Souls of Beasts do think; but then, confiftently with it felf, it fuppofes alfo that they are not Matter, but immaterial, and by confequence immortal. Thofe of the other way conceiving this will engage them in great Difficulties and Inconveniences,chufe rather to fuppofe that they are mere Matter, but then they are alfo fo felfconfiftent as in confequence of their common Principle to hold that they do not think. Between which two comes in the third Hypothe

fis, endeavouring to unite thefe extremes in one, by fuppofing that the Souls of Beafts do both think, and are alfo material.

6. Against the middle of thefe Suppofitions (for fo indeed it properly is, a Logical middle, tho' as here fet down a Phyfical extreme) there lies a ftrong Prefumption, and a very clear Argument. The Prefumption is this, that it tends to undermine the Foundation, upon which our own Immortality ftands. For if the Souls of Brutes, notwithstanding their being mere Matter do yet think, then our Souls notwithstanding their Thinking, may be for ought we know material too, and fo liable to Corruption. The Argument which lies fo clear against it, is no less than the whole preceding Chapter, wherein it has been fhewn that Matter is utterly uncapable of Thought. But now if Matter cannot think, then from this Principle we may fecurely argue, that if the Souls of Brutes are Matter, they do not think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. Or if you will thus, that either they are not Matter, or if they are, they do not Think; or that either they do not Think, or if they do, then they are not Matter. From which two forms of arguing the one Hypothetical, and the other Disjunctive, it plainly appears that the Souls of Brutes cannot be Material, and Thinking too, fince if they were, then Matter would Think, which would be a contradiction to the Principle supposed.