7. Rejecting therefore this middle way, which unites Matter and Thought together in Brutes, as utterly abfurd and unmaintainable, we shall now find the competition to lie wholly between the two extremes, that is, whether the Souls of Beafts be Matter and don't Think, or whether they do Think, and are not Matter.

8. These will be found to be the two Rival Suppofitions; but before we determine any thing in favour of either of them, I must do them both the Juftice to fay, that whether abfolutely right or wrong, they are however both in the general confiftent with themselves, which the middle Opinion is not. When I fay confiftent with themfelves, my meaning is, that they do not contradict in one Part, what they affirm in the other, which the middle Opinion upon the Principle fuppofed plainly does. Since by that Suppofition, to fay that the Souls of Brutes are Matter, is by confequence to fay that they do not think ; and to fay that they do think, is by confequence to fay that they are not Matter, which in effect will be to fay, that they are Matter, and not Matter, and that they think and do not think.

9. The two extremes then, are the only confiftent Opinions. But however 'tis one thing for an Opinion to be confiftent with itfelf, and another thing to be abfolutely true, fince tho' one part of an Opinion may not

overthrow another, yet the whole may be overthrown, or shewn to be falfe, by fome other Argument. And fince, tho' both of these fupposals are confiftent with themselves, yet but one of them can be true, it will now be a proper enquiry to confider which is most likely to be fo.

10. Now as for that Hypothefis which a fcribes Thought without Matter to Brutes, tho' it be not nigh fo abfurd as that which supposes them to be Material, and yet to think, yet I must needs own that 'tis intangled with much difficulty and perplexity, is liable to feveral rational Arguments that may be urged against it, and has none to rely upon, but only fuch as are drawn from a certain imaginary Experience, that is grounded upon the confuse appearances of Senfe.

II. For in the first place (to give a Specimen of this charge) if we afcribe Thought, or Perception to Brutes in any degree, tho' it be only in that of Senfation, where fhall we ftop, or what fhall we deny them? If they are allow'd to have it in the degree of Senfation, why may they not be capable of it in the degree of Reason? That indeed is thought too much, even by those who contend for Thought in Brutes, who as kind as they are pleased to be to them, are yet however willing to distinguish themselves from them, by a peculiar Privilege which they referve to themselves above them. And accordingly while Man glories in being

Part II. a reasonable Creature, the poor Beafts are fain to be contented with an Inferior kind of Knowledge, that which for diftinction fake, is call'd a fenfible or fenfitive Knowledge, or at moft with fome dark adumbrations of Reason (dark enough indeed, as being they know not what) fomething that looks like it, but is not it. But why this Partiality? And why, fince they are fo liberal to them, as to allow them Thought, are they fo fcanty in the Proportion of it? Is it that they may not make them equal to themselves? But tho' this may be a Reason of Inducement, yet this is no warrantable or juftifying Reafon. And I doubt it will be impoffible to affign any that is. For if the Souls of Brutes are Matter, then they are not capable of the lowest degree of Thought, and if they are not Matter, then they may be capable of a higher as well as of a lower. And if we give them any, how fhall we know when we have gone high enough? For as for that diftinction of a fenfible Knowledge, as oppofed to that which is of the rational Kind, either by fenfible Knowledge is meant the Knowledge that is from a Material Principle, and in this Senfe there is no fuch thing as a fenfible Knowledge, because Matter cannot think; or else that Knowledge which is from an immaterial Principle by the Mediation of the Senfes, or upon fome impreffions made upon certain parts of the Body. But now fuch a fenfible Knowledge or Perception (for we take Knowledge

ledge here in a large Senfe) tho' call'd fenfible in a certain refpect, is yet abfolutely Intelle&tual, tho' perhaps of the lowest kind; and if Brutes are once allow'd to have an intellectual Perception in any degree, why they should ftint them just to the very loweft, is what neither I, nor they, I believe, do well underftand.

12. It will be faid perhaps that they deny them Reafon, because by their Actions, it ap pears that they have none. But in the firft. place, if they make this Plea, how are they confiftent with themfelves, fince at another time, when another end is to be ferved, they fo highly magnify their great Sagacity, and the many wonderful Performances which they are obferv'd to do? Befides, this Argument from their Actions, concludes nothing against their being capable of Reafon (upon the fuppofition of their Thinking) however it may be pretended against their actual having it. But neither will it prove that. For in the first place, how are they fure that they understand their Conduct, and that the filly appearance which their Actions feem to carry, may not be owing to their not being acquainted with the fecret Measures by which they proceed? But however fuppofing their Actions to be really as filly, and ill-conducted as they appear to them; yet how after all do they know but that this may be merely by fome Organical Indifpofitions of their Bodies, and not thro' any defect in their F

under

understanding Faculty, just as it is in the cafe of Fools and Changelings, whom yet these very Men will allow to be reafonable Creatures, as to the Power and Faculty, tho' not as to the actual use and exercise of it. And how do they know but that Brutes (who certainly do not act more fillily than fome Men) may be fo too, if they once allow them to have any Thought. Thofe indeed that think they have none, must by confequence deny them that of the superior kind; but to grant them one degree of Thought, and to deny them another, feems at beft very arbitrary, and without a fufficient foundation in Reafon. So that methinks they fhould either deny them what they grant them, or not be fo difficult to grant them what they are pleased to deny them.

13. But again, as we fhall not well know where to ftop as to Thought, if we allow any degree of it to Brute Creatures, so neither fhall we know where to ftop as to Brutes. For which of them will you exclude? If you will suppose a Horse to think, or a Dog, or a Bird, then why not a Fly, or a Loufe, or a Worm, or a Snail, or even an Oyfter? And if fuch things as these should be allow'd capable of Thought (which I am apt to fancy the most liberal bestowers of it, would not be extreme forward to grant, at least as to the laft of them, tho' upon the foundation they go, I fee no reason why they should make any exception)