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centre, under the orders of the generals Sommoriva, Ott, Gotteheim, and Bellegarde, extended in a waving line by the roots of the maritime Alps to Oneglia, Albinga, and Finale, and held feveral pofts on the very borders of France. The left wing of the Auftrian army, under the command of general Kray, occupied the vallies of the Bormida, Erno, the Orba, and the Scrivia. It was in poffeffion of Safello, Ovada, Novi, and Serravalle, and mafked Gavi. A fmall body of troops, placed in the imperial fiefs, held the roads leading from Genoa to Pavia and Plaentia. Another was pofted in the upper valley of the Taro, where it communicated with another, under general Klenau, whofe principal force was concentrated on the Magra; his advanced pofts reaching as far as Leftria and Varele. Such was the femicircular line occupied by the imperial troops oppofite to the enemy. Some others were difperfed in Tufcany, the march of Ancona, the territories of Bologna and Ferrara, the Mantuan, and the Milanefe. The reinforce ments, which had arrived during the last three months of the campaign, railed the number of Auftrians, fpread over the face of Italy, to at leaft fixty thoufand: and they had about ten thoufand Piedmontele auxiliaries. twenty thousand Tufcans and NeaAbout politans, too, embraced their caufe: but they had no enemies to contend with, or rather to punish, but the difarmed foldiers of the Cifalpine, Roman, and Partheropian republics.
The pofitions which at the end of the campaign remained in pofteffion of the French, on the fide of Italy, were as follows: the right
wing of the army of Switzerland oc cupied the valley of the Rhone, and had its advanced pofts in the dif ferent fmall paffages of the Valais and the Great St. Bernard, The left of the united armies of the Alps and of Italy, poffeffed the Little St. Bernard, Mount Cenis, and the extremities of the other paflages of the Tarentaile and of the Mauri tachments of infantry, the Van enne. It fupported, with fome de dois, who were armed in favour of the republic, and oppofed the imperial pofts placed near to Chenale and to Argentiere, in the vallies of There the left of the united army the Vraita, and of the Stura.→ of the Alps and Italy, under the command of Maffena, ended. The Coni to Nice, and in spite of the centre guarded the two roads from rigour of the season, had pofts on the Col de Feneftre, and the Col de Tenda. Ponente as far as Savona, and kept It lined the Riviera di ftrong detachments in the middle of the Ligurian Alps, and on all the paffages which lead to the valley of the Tanaro. The right of the French army garrifoned Savona and Genoa, and had cantonments on the four as alfo the towns between them, roads which lead to the vallies of the Bormida, the Erno, the Orba, and the Scrivia. On the first, their the fecond, beyond Saffolo; on the piquets went beyond Cairo; on third, beyond Campo-Freddo ; and, having alfo, on the latter, a garrifon on the fourth, beyond Voltaggio, in the fort of Gavi. They faced the imperialifts in the two roads and Bobbio acrofs the imperial fiefs, which go from Genoa to Voghera poffeffed a part of that chain of mountains which feparates the valley of the Trebbia from the Riviera
di Levante, and covered on that fide, the approaches to Genoa.Upon this long and irregular line from Genoa to the Great St. Bernard, there were not more than forty thousand men. From the Var to Genoa there were fcarcely twenty-five thoufand, almost all infantry. A reinforcement of fifteen thoufand men, from Switzerland, or from the interior, were on the march to join the army of Italy. Others were likewife promifed; but those which arrived, were few in number, and fo great was the void in the ranks of the French army, produced by an epidemic fever, and by the defertion, that Mallena, in the month of April following, had not more than thirty-five thousand men in the whole of the extent of the county of Nice, and of the state of Genoa. The privations, diftreffes, and miferies, in which the foldiers were left, during the rigours of winter, 'were felt more fenfibly, and fuffered with more impatience, during the idleness of winter-quarters, than they would have been amidst the toils of marches, and the tumults of "action. Several infurrections broke out among the troops that occupied the territories of Genoa. Companies of infantry, and even whole battalions returned into
France with arms and baggage. Buonaparte and Mafiena exhaufted their oratorial exhortations in vain.
Nothing but fevere examples, and fome hundreds of thousands of livres extorted from the wretched Genoa, could ftop this contagious
malady of infubordination and defertion, which, no less than the fever before mentioned, threatened to leave the mountains of Liguria, and the frontiers of France, without defenders.
On the Upper Rhine, general Moreau had, by the end of February, made the neceffary difpofitions for the immediate commencement of the campaign. The force under his command was estimated at one hundred and thirty thousand men: without taking into the account the army of referve at Dijon, under the immediate orders of Buona
parte, which, it was univerfally believed, was deftined to fupport and co-operate with that of Moreau. Neither the Auftrians nor any of the politicians of Europe, penetrated the first confuls defign of marching his army, by the almost impracticable route, which he actually took, into Italy. The cavalry of general Moreau amounted to twenty thoufand; and he had eight regiments of light artillery, with thirty-two field-pieces, and fixteen arquebuziers to each regiment.His head-quarters were at Strafburg. The right wing of his army extended to the Helvetic Rhine, and he had a confiderable body of troops affembled in the environs of Rheineck. To this quarter he fent a numerous park of artillery, with a corps of pontonniers, fo that there was every appearance that this. wing of his army was to pafs the Rhine at this point. The force and the pofition of this army an
This however was, if not certainly foreseen, fhrewdly conjectured by two French genen:ls, royalifts, in London, who, when the writer of this, about the middle of March, put the queftion, how it could be poffible for all the invention of Buonaparte to contrive means of fending relief in time to Genoa? replied, that this was not necessary; that it was poffible, by a wider cordon, to blockade and befiege the befiegers.
nounced it to be the primum mobile, of the campaign. His left wing, and his rear, were protected by the forts of the Rhine, Holland, and the neutrality of Pruffia; and the direction of the whole army towards Vienna rendered it formidable to the emperor. An official note from Buonaparte, communicated to the Helvetic government, the rejection of peace by the enemies of France, and at the fame time expreffed a hope of his being able to force them to accept it.
Buonaparte, in his perfonal demeanor, began now to aflume a military air, which indeed he had fuftained pretty much ever fince his elevation to the fupreme authority. He reviewed, in the Champde-Mars, all the troops that were in Paris and its vicinity. The French, as well as the imperalifts, every where moved out of their cantonments. Skirmishes between parties of huffars, advanced-pofts on both fides furprized, cannonading from one fide of the Rhine to the other, and the proclamations of the oppofite generals, announced an approaching and terrible campaign.
The communication between the Auftrian army of Italy and that of the archduke was ftill maintained by the corps commanded by general Davidovich, which occupied Chiavenna and Bellinzona, and stretched towards the country of the Grifons. Unfortunately we have it not in our power to embellifh our narra
tive of the prefent campaign with the active fervices of that brave, wife, and virtuous prince, who was obliged to quit the army from ill health, and perhaps fome other circumftances. But a better choice of a commander, to fupply, as far poffible, his place, could not have been made, than that of general Kray, who took the chief command of the army, on the eighteenth of March. early ftage, as a bad omen, that But it was remarked, even at this between the general and the mithere was not a good understanding nifter at war, who were both of them quick in count Lherbach; their tempers, tions equally obftinate and impeand of difpofirions.
forcement of one thousand WirtemGeneral Kray received a reinburghers, and as many Palatines, who were deftined to fupport the Auftrians pofted between Raftadt and Kehl. The different corps of the Wirtemburgh, Palatine, and Mayence, militia behind the Auftrian army of the were ftationed Rhine, at the entrance of the defiles of Suabia, between the river Enz, the Necker, and the Mayne, between Widbad and Pfoutzheim, by the Odenwald towards Eschafas far as Heideberg, and from thence fenburg on the Mayne, and between Frankfort and Mayance, along the Nidda.
The Bavarian troops* affembled at Doncwert. The first column,
Neither the Bavarian troops in the pay of England, nor the Wirtemburgers, nor the militia of Suabia, the Electorate, and Mayence, all of them alfo in the pay of England, are to be confounded with the Palatines, Wirtemburgers, and Mayencers, who were furnished as contingents of the empire; and of whom the firft were ftationed between Philipfburg and Raftadt, and the laft on the Nidda, between Frankfort and Mayence.
under the orders of general baron de Deux-Ponts, formerly in the fervice of France, was compofed of
Six battalions of infantry, consisting each of 400 men
Three fquadron of light cavalry, of 100 men each
Two companies of arquebuziers, of 40 men each
Three companies of artillery, of 40 men each
General Bertier, on the twentieth of April, joined the army of So referve at Dijon, of which he took the chief command, until the arrival of Buonaparte. This army was at leaft fifty thoufand ftrong, well appointed, and in all refpects in most excellent order. By this time, a detachment of eight hundred Auftrians had taken poffeffion of Mount Cenis. General Bertier, informed of this circumftance, on his arrival at Dijon, reviewed the army, and went directly to Bafle, where he had a conference with general Moreau. It was determined that military operations thould be begun on the Rhine, on the week thereafter. Intelligence being received that the Aufirians had taken potieflion of Mount Cenis, general Thureau, fet out from Briançon, proceeded to Exiles, from thence towards Suza, and coming up with the rear of the detachment, which the Auftrians had pushed forward to Mount Cenis, he obliged them to retreat. and took a part of this fmall garrifon prifoners of war.
This firft divifion was to be raised to three thousand five hundred men, by a levy of recruits. This corps was reviewed on the fourth of April, and, on the fifth, began their march to the camp of Ridlingen, on the Danube.
quire fresh renown, by newatchievements. The greater part of the Auftrian troops that had paffed the dead of winter, in Alexandria, were now fent to the frontier of the flate of Genoa.
The fecond divifion of the Bavarian troops paffed a review at Donawert, on the twenty-feventh of April, and had the fame deftiration. The corps of the one thonfand Wirtemburghers aflembled at Ridlingen, and, together with three regiments of emigrant Swifs, were joined to the Bavarians. The particular deftination of the corps of Condé was not at that time known. They had been in the fervice of Ruffia, and had pafled into that of England. They received orders to march to the coaft of the Mediterranean. General Melas, who commanded the Auftrian army in Italy, fet out from Turin on the twenty-feventh of March, and, on the evening of the fame day, arrived in Alexandria, where he established his head quarters, and immediately iffued a proclamation to the army, announcing the opening of the campaign, and exhorting the troops to remember their former bravery, and to acVOL. XLII.
Malena, commander-in-chief of the French, in Italy, confidering the miferable ftate of his, troops, came to a determination to confentrate the whole of his forces on the river of Genoa.
The general fyftem of war, adopted by the conful, was, to keep the whole of the troops together in a mafs on fome favourable points, whether for offence or defence.The reader already perceives his fecret defign, in cftablishing what, for [N]
a blind to the enemy, he called the army of referve, though it was de ftined to be the most active, at Dijon. From this central point he menaced at once Germany, Switzerland, and Italy; but thofe countries the most where his attack was not intended. The war in Germany he confided to the ftrong army under Moreau, while he, with the army under his command, fhould go to reconquer Italy, the theatre of his moft fplendid victories. But the first object, in his prefent career, was to arrive in time to fave Genoa, and the unfortunate army of Maflena, which defended that place; the moft important in all Italy, to be preserved or to be conquered.
The principal object and aim of the Auftrians, who, in the course of the laft campaign, had recovered
all that they had loft in Italy, was to keep the French armies, in Switzerland and on the Rhine, in play, while they fhould push with all poffible vigour the fiege of Genoa: the poffeffion of which was alone wanting to render them complete mafters of all Italy. This object, which they confidered as now with in their grafp, and foon to be accomplished, would have enabled them to bear with their whole united force on Switzerland, by the poffeffion of which, it would be in their power to force the French to keep on the defenfive, on the fide of the fouth as well as of the eaft. Such then, being the oppofite views of the two contending armies, it will be proper to hegin our narrative of the campaign with the memorable siege of Genoa,