I cannot myself perceive the fame object: But I cannot doubt what I myself perceive, or believe that to be poffible, which I fee to be impoffible.

It is therefore evident, that to question the information of our faculties, or the conclufions of our reason, without fome ground from our faculties themselves, is a direct impoffibility. So that those very philofophers, who pretend to question the informations of their faculties, neither do, nor can really question them, fo long as they appear unquestionable.

To be fufpicious of one's own judgment in all cafes, where it is poffible to err, and to be cautious of proceeding to too rafh conclufions, is the very character of wifdom. But to doubt, or rather pretend to doubt, where reafon fees no ground for doubt, even where the mind distinctly perceives truth, is endeavouring at a pitch of folly, of which human nature is not capable.

If the mind is any thing, if there are any reafoning faculties; what is the object of those reafoning faculties? Not falfhood. For falfhood is a negative, a mere nothing, and is not capable of being perceived, or of being an object of the mind. If therefore there is a rational mind in the univerfe, the object of that mind is truth. If there is no truth, there is no perception. Whatever the mind perceives, fo far as the perception is real, is truth. When the reasoning faculty is deceived, it is not by diftinctly seeing fomething

that is not; for that is impoffible; but either by not perceiving fomething, which, if perceived, would alter the ftate of the cafe upon the whole; or by feeing an object of the understanding thro' a false medium. But thefe, or any other causes of error, do by no means affect the perception of a fimple idea; nor the perception of a fimple relation between two fimple ideas; nor a fimple inference from fuch fimple relation. No mind whatever can diftinctly and intuitively perceive, or fee, twice two to be five. Because, that twice two should be five, is an impoffibility and felfcontradiction in terms, as much as faying that four is five, or that a thing is what it is not. Nor can any mind diftinctly perceive, that if two be to four as four is to eight, therefore thrice two is four; for that would be diftinctly perceiving an impoffibility. Now an impoffibility is what has no existence, nor can exift. And can any mind perceive, clearly perceive, what does not exift?

To perceive nothing, or not to perceive, is the fame. So that it is evident, fo much of any thing as can really be perceived, must be real and true. There is therefore either no object of mind; no rational faculties in the universe; or there is a real truth in things, which the mind perceives, and which is the only object it can perceive, in the fame manner, as it is impoffible for the eye to see abfolute nothing, or to fee, and not fee, at the fame time.

The

The only point therefore to be attended to, is to endeavour at clear perceptions of things, with all their circumstances, connexions, and dependencies; which requires more and more accuracy and attention, according as the conclufion to be drawn arifes out of more or lefs complex premises; and it is easy to imagine a mind capable of taking in a much greater number and variety of particulars, than can be comprehended by any human being, and of feeing clearly through all their mutual relations, however minute, extensive, or complicated. To such a mind all kinds of dif ficulties in all parts of knowledge might be as eafy to investigate, as to us a common question in arithmetic, and with equal certainty. For truths of all kinds are alike certain and alike clear to minds, whofe capacities and states qualify them for investigating them. And what is before faid with regard to our fafety in trufting our faculties in mathematical or arithmetical points, is equally juft with refpect to moral and all other fubjects. Whatever is a real, clear, and distinct object of perception, must be fome real existence. For an abfolute nothing can never be an object of diftinct perception. Now the differences, agreements, contrafts, analogies, and all other relations obtaining among moral ideas, are as effentially real, and as proper fubjects of reafoning, as thofe in numbers and mathematics. I can no more be deceived, nor bring myself to doubt a clear moral propofition, or axiom, than a mathe

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a mathematical one. I can no more doubt whe ther happiness is not preferable to miféry, than whether the whole is not greater than any of its parts. I can no more doubt, whether a being, who enjoys fix degrees of happiness, and at the fame time labours under one degree of misery, is not in a better fituation than another, who enjoys but three degrees of happiness, and is expofed to one of misery, fuppofing those degrees equal in both, than I can doubt whether a man, who is poffeffed of fix thousand pounds and owes one, or another, who is worth only three thoufand pounds and owes one, is the richer. And fo of all other cafes, where our views and perceptions are clear and distinct. For a truth of one fort is as much a truth, as of another, and, when fully perceived, is as incapable of being doubted of or mistaken.

Yet fome have argued, that though, as to numbers and mathematics, there is a real independent truth in the nature of things, which could not poffibly have been otherwise, it is quite different in morals. Though it was impoffible in the nature of things, that twice two should be five, it might have been so contrived, that, univerfally, what is now virtue fhould have been vice, and what is now vice fhould have been virtue. That all our natural notions of right and wrong are wholly arbitrary and factitious; a mere inftinct or taste; very suitable indeed to the present state

of

of things: but by no means founded in rerum naturâ, and only the pure effect of a pofitive ordination of Divine wisdom, to answer certain ends.

It does not fuit the defign of this work to enter into any long difcuffion of knotty points. But I would ask thofe gentlemen, who maintain the above doctrine, Whether the Divine scheme in creating a univerfe, and communicating happiness to innumerable beings, which before had no existence, was not good, or preferable to the contrary? If they fay, there was no good in creating and communicating happiness, they must fhew the wisdom of the infinitely-wife Creator in choofing rather to create than not. They must fhew how (to fpeak with reverence) he came to choose to create a world. For fince all things appear to him exactly as they are, if it was not in itself wiser and better to create than not, it must have appeared so to him, and if it had appeared fo to him, it is certain he never had produced a world.

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To this fome anfwer, that his creating a world was not the confequence of his feeing it to be in itself better to create than not; but he was moved to it by the benevolence of his own nature, which attribute of goodness or benevolence is, as well as benevolence in a good man, according to their notion of it, no more than a taste or inclination, which happens, they know not how, to be in the Divine nature; but is in itself indifferent, and abfracting from its confequences, neither amia

ble