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A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the ..., Volum 1
Visualització completa - 1878
A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the ..., Volum 2
Visualització completa - 1874
A Treatise on Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental ...
Visualització completa - 1874
abstract according actually admit already answer appearance arises become beginning belief body Book Book 11 cause chap colour complex conception concerning consciousness consider consists constitute continued definition depends derived determined difficulty distinction distinguish doctrine effect equally essence evident existence experience explain extension fact feeling fiction figure follows give given Hume Hume's identity imagination implies impossible impression individual inference instance judgment kind knowledge less Locke Locke's manner matter means memory merely mind nature necessary never notion object observation once operations original particular passage perceive perception philosophical points possible present primary principle produce proposition qualities question real existence reality reason reference reflection regard relation represent resemblance result SECT sensation sense separate simple idea single space speak substance succession supposed supposition taken theory thing thinking thought tion true understanding
Pàgina 170 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself 'at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Pàgina 109 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Pàgina 44 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Pàgina 548 - Where am I, or what ? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return ? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me, and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me ? I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty.
Pàgina 34 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Pàgina 138 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series — the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Pàgina 33 - ... ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things : but universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their existence, even those words and ideas which in their signification are general.
Pàgina 64 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.
Pàgina 259 - As to the first question, we may observe that what we call a mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.
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The Cult of the Market: Economic Fundamentalism and Its Discontents
Visualització completa - 2007